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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
KENNETH C. COLE

Bills of Rights are like New Year's Resolutions. The discipline they
impose is self-imposed. It is also usually imposed in a period of sobriety in the fond hope that the conditions which brought forth excesses in the past will not do so in the future. And, more often than
not, the history of nations like that of individuals teaches that while
the spirit may be willing the flesh is weak.
The flesh is weak because solemn declarations of good intention
may have no roots in past performance-the history of the people may
have developed no institutions providing an earnest that the good
resolutions can be kept. They remain so many pious words abstracted
from the character of the people for whom they are made. In the case
of the American Bill of Rights this is happily not the case. There is
practically nothing in our bill of rights which had not already been
hammered out on the anvil of the English common law. There is
hardly anything which does not presuppose the institution of courts
and procedures on the common law model. In fact, I may go further
and state as part of my thesis that the formal language of the first
eight amendments to our federal Constitution (usually called our Bill of
Rights) has been only a convenient peg upon which our courts have
hung a common law version of individual liberties.
This is not a startling proposition to be sure, but it has had to meet
opposition from two extremes and I ought to outline these other propositions in order to distinguish my own. On the one hand, the ideologists
of human liberty have always had a curious faith in words. These
persons derive profound satisfaction out of an aspect of the American
constitution which leaves me quite unmoved. I mean its formal, written, legislative, character, replete with property placed commas and
periods, colons and semi-colons.
Tom Paine was one of those typical 18th century libertarians. He
was a great publicist, enthusiast, and exhorter. And Tom, you may
recall, scornfully charged that the British had no constitution because
they had no one divine document to serve as a blue-print for Utopia.
This was in his great literary debate with Burke. Burke dared to
prefer English liberties over French revolutionary liberties and Paine
made great rhetorical point of the fact that Burke could not cite him
chapter and verse in any British constitution for any of these English
liberties.
Tom had no sense at all of the background of concrete remedies and
institutions which have in fact afforded the British subject far more
substantial liberty than the French. And we have continued to produce modest editions of Tom Paine, the Prophet of Political Reform,
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from that time to this. The starting point of these people is always
some abstraction supposed to generate principles of freedom by a sort
of spontaneous combustion. For this purpose the "sovereignty of the
people" has served as well or as ill as the "natural rights of man." But
neither formula will produce the kind of Bill of Rights I am talking
about.
But there is another extreme point of view with which I must disassociate myself. There have always been those whose skepticism about
words as meaningless abstractions leads them to emphasize the personal motives and interests of judges as the real generative force behind constitutional interpretation. The Bill of Rights, say these people, is -what the judges say it is. And this perfectly sound proposition
is then so manipulated as to make it clear that they mean the judges
as individuals conditioned by such things as what they had for breakfast.
The judges, indeed, put life into the law. Even more, I will admit
that they make the law-if you will permit me to add that they
"make" it as representatives of an institution which consistently discourages the use of much discretion in this function. They "make"
it under peculiar conditions which require that the judge shall fit both
the method and substance of his decision into an institutional pattern
of precedents stretching back (as the older judges liked to say in the
case of the common law) to a time "since the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary."
So I come back to my original point that our bill of rights must
never be taken in abstraction from this institutional background. Only
those propositions which had some fixed common law meaning have
been given full force and effect. The others-and I can think of only
two others-were either disregarded or watered down to common law
comprehension. And perhaps I can best make my point about the
essential nature of our Bill of Rights by taking up these two orphan
propositions in more detail.
The propositions I have in mind are those supposed to insure freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and the press, respectively.
As for freedom of religion, Article I of the Amendments begins as
follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."
Religious freedom against the state you say. And, I think, quite
rightly so far as the intent of the framers was concerned. They did
have in mind-if only in a certain nebulous and inspirational fashion-the nation of a sphere of freedom for the individual against state
interference. They assumed the natural right of a man to worship God
in his own way-in short a liberty to follow God in the things which
did not belong to Caesar. But the common law had not then absorbed,
nor has it yet absorbed, anything of this natural rights doctrine. The
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common law does not teach that there are any limits to the rightful
claims of the state on the allegiance of its citizens due to the importance of religion. Quite the contrary: the common law absorbed ideas
of toleration founded upon reasons of state and not reasons of conscience. The point of view of the common law remains substantially
that of Elizabethan statecraft when the Spanish Armada threatened
England: a man's religious affiliations are unimportant as compared
to his political affiliations. We are Englishmen first, Catholics or
Protestants a poor second.
The aspect of our first amendment which has received judicial
sanction is therefore the prohibition against the establishment of religion-against official discrimination between sects. Congress may
not, to be sure, appropriate public funds for the beenfit of this or
that religious group. It may not set up religious tests for office or voting. Nor may it provide for chaplains in the Army or Navy out of
proportion to the number of communicants in the armed services. But
there is no limitation on the power of the legislature to disregard
religious convictions entirely in providing for the maintenance of order
or defense of the state. Conscientious objectors to war have no constitutional protection whatever against enforced military service. They
may not even become citizens of the United States if Congress says
that such a mental attitude is inconsistent with citizenship. And the
Supreme Court has recently held that the religious sensibilities of a
particular sect are not important enough to be made the basis for a
valid exercise of local police power.
If, therefore, we look to the facts of constitutional interpretation
we find that our bill of rights testifies to the unimportance of religious
conviction not to its importance vis a vis political allegiance. I do not
mean to say that there are no advantages to the devout individual in
this attitude. But it is best not to confuse a constitutional guarantee
against religious discrimination with a constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom. The government may not enforce uniformities of
conduct upon us in the name of religion, but it may enforce any uniformities it likes in the name of politics.
Freedom of Speech and the Press offers another contrast between
the words of the document and the facts of constitutional interpretation. Here too the framers of the amendment no doubt had certain
inchoate ideas about assuring the citizen freedom to criticize his government. But actually the common law afforded no basis for this belief. Not that there were no liberal features in the common law attitude toward the problem. Censorship-the imposition of previous restraints on publication-was definitely out of favor with the law.
This was primarily because censorship operated to give effect to executive d ete r m i n a t i o n of private right without recourse to the
courts. The institution of courts and juries was effectively "by-

1943]

AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS

passed" if the executive could simply prevent objectionable things
from being said instead of having to prosecute individuals for having
said them.
But the common law had no prejudice against the infliction of any
penalty, no matter how severe, for past utterances. Nor had it any
criterion whatever by which an innocent utterance could be distinguished from a guilty one. Or, perhaps, it would be more suggestive to say that the criterion the common law did have was more
likely to protect an inept government from effective criticism-than to
protect the honest citizen in making that criticism. While the framers
of the first amendment were talking about freedom of speech the
common law was laying it down that, in cases of seditious libel, "the
greater the truth the greater the libel."
This does not mean, I hasten to say, that the common law had nothing to contribute to the liberties of the citizen. He was guaranteed a
hearing by independent judges according to the forms of law even
though the law itself was willing to recognize a wide discretion in
the government of the day. More than this, the popular institution of
the jury was called into play to determine the guilt or innocence of
a defendant in seditious libel cases. So one may say that a very substantial kind of liberty was assured the subject. But again it would
be a grave mistake to confuse this liberty with freedom of speech in
the popular sense. No sphere of free criticism of public officers can
be defined in advance. The only rule which can be stated is the rule
of Reason-the sense of reasonableness and fair play embodied in the
system of common law adjudication. Without this system free speech
vanishes into thin air.
I am fully aware that there have been brave attempts by our courts
to achieve a substantive definition of free speech, and I don't want to
be understood to say that these have been utterly abortive. The point
nonetheless is that the solid ground for constitutional interpretation
here is the slow evolution of the law of seditious libel, the law of
blasphemous libel and the law of obscene libel in the hands of judges.
Free speech is what remains after these bases for punishment have
been considered. And when this is analyzed it will be found that the
rock-bottom guarantee to the citizen lies simply in his recourse to the
methods of law and not in any libertarian doctrines of that law.
The same dependence of our Bill of Rights on the legal institution,
instead of upon declarations of political aspiration, may be shown in
other ways. Some of them are the fairly obvious staple of the constitutional lawyer. For example, the Supreme Court interpreted the
14th*Amendment provision prohibiting the states from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, to
include corporations. And it expanded the meaning of due process of
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law to include, not only the methods of enforcing the police power
against individuals, but the substance of the police power. Thus our
bill of rights has been interpreted to prevent such things as wholesale
price-fixing and wage control as well as such things as infliction of
the death penalty without jury trial.
But I don't intend to burden you with a discussion of these stock
examples. Instead of this I shall refer to two other less well known
situations in which the law has, so to speak, cut its own channel without too much dependence on political or legislative declaration.
Let us first take up the problem of whom private rights are available against, and whom they are available to. In other words, let us
assume for the moment that the legal institution and political aspiration are at one as respects the content of rights. In general, that is,
law and politics agree that the content of our private rights is the
common law rights of Englishmen and not the natural rights of man.
But are we going to generalize the common law rights of Englishmen
to apply to every one-citizens and non-citizens-or are we going to
limit them in some fashion to those who have a permanent stake in the
country? And are these common law rights to be available against all
agencies of government, or only against particular ones, and dependent
on circumstances at that?
On these questions I think there has been some divergence between
political declaration and legal exposition. In general, the political understanding of our bill of rights identifies them with rights of citizens.
And political understanding also regards them as good against any
agency of government in all circumstances. The common law, on the
contrary has never shown any disposition to limit private rights to an
elite whose loyalties to the state can be attested by the fact of citizenship. As applied to American conditions, however, it has had a
good deal to say about differences between the agencies of government
from the standpoint of private rights.
It is, for example, judicial and not legislative or political doctrine,
that we do not have the same rights against the federal and state governments. The first eight amendments to the Constitution are good
against Congress alone. Moreover, the general language of the 14th
Amendment requiring the states to observe due process of law does not
cover all the specific rights enumerated in the first eight amendments.
It follows that there is no federal guarantee against our being brought
to trial before a state court on a criminal charge without previous
indictment by a grand jury. This guarantee applies only to federal
prosecutions.
It would also appear to be judicial, as distinct from political, doctrine which lies behind the rule that even Congress is not bound by
such procedural requirements of the Bill of Rights when legislating for
our outlying territories and possessions. These territories are no.
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"incorporated"; so it follows that one can be brought to trial before
even a federal court in Puerto Rico, for instance, without an indictment by a grand jury.
On the other hand, the courts have generalized the class of those
to whom private rights belong much beyond legislative or political
intent. It is primarily due to the courts that our private rights are
rights of all persons irrespective of citizenship. So far as political or
legislative intent is concerned, citizenship might well have been taken
as the touchstone of.private rights. For example, the 14th amendment
referred to United States citizenship as if it were a source of basic private rights: no state is to make any law which shall abridge the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." But the
Supreme Court preferred to work with a constitutional system in
which distinctions as to rights were implied from the source from
which interference came, rather than from the status of persons to
which they applied. Accordingly, that particular clause in the Constitution is pretty much a dead letter. There are no especially significant
rights involved in United States citizenship. It is only when a citizen
goes abroad that he finds himself equipped with any rights peculiar to
that status.
There is an exception to this attitude of the law toward citizenship
which has some special importance for us on the Pacific Coast. The
right to own land may be confined to citizens on good common- law
precedents. Accordingly, no state would find itself in conflict with
the due process clause of the federal Constitution should it limit land
ownership to that class. And a few Western states have made use of
this privilege to bar aliens ineligible to citizenship from acquiring
these rights except where guaranteed by treaty. It is also true that
many states have discriminated against non-resident aliens when it
comes to succession to property. On the whole, however, it is accurate to say that our common law is highly cosmopolitan in its ideas
about who is entitled to the private rights of the bill of rights. At any
rate, it is more cosmopolitan than the political agencies which have
formally announced the rights.
Very much the same thing may also be said about the comprehensiveness of citizenship. The law has helped to make citizenship so
comprehensive that even were it accepted as a significant category
for private rights it would not exclude many persons from their protection. What I have in mind here is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 14th Amendment to confer citizenship on all persons born in
the United States regardless of parentage or character of residence
here. This was in the great case of Wong Kim Ark in which the
citizenship of a-child born of Chinese parents was confirmed even
though the existing naturalization law clearly prevented the parents
from ever becoming naturalized.
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Let me pass now to another aspect of the Bill of Rights which also
reflects the character of the legal institution that nourishes it more
than it reflects the political aspiration that sired it. This aspect brings
us back again to the quality of the Bill of Rights and is widely regarded
by liberals as a distinctly "non-liberal" aspect. The law is supposed to
be more solicitous for property rights than the personal or "human"
rights. Is this true, and, if so, is it a reproach to our system?
There are so many angles to these questions that I hesitate to attempt categorical answers. There are, I think, certain rather obvious
considerations which can be gotten out of the way first before treading
on controversial ground. For example, it is certainly not true that personal rights which are consistent with the scheme of property in all its
capitalisticforms have been slighted under our Bill of Rights. No one
doubts that our law offers an excellent remedy against the arbitrary
imprisonment of any person. The writ of habeas corpus is one of the
outstanding glories of the common law. Neither will anyone question
that the law has always been adamant against chattel slavery. In
fact, the common law was ready to afford remedies against slavery before public sentiment in this country had crystallized in that direction.
On the other hand, if one means by human rights freedom from injury to one's dignity, pride, or reputation, it is equally obvious that
the common law is a materialistic system: the kind of rights which it is
equipped to recognize are those which can be estimated in money. It
is not as sensitive as it very well might be, to mental anguish disassociated from commercial considerations. Or, to put it another way, the
law would be much quicker to appreciate the mental anguish of a
landowner if you trespassed on his land than the mental anguish of a
law-abiding citizen whom you insulted on the street. I daresay that the
typical common law attitude toward a possible claim by Roland Hayes
for damages due to indignities sustained at the hands of Georgia police authorities might well be "no bones broken."
But these observations hardly touch the real animus behind the assertion that the law pays attention to property rights instead of human
rights. The human or personal rights being referred to in this context are rights which are not consistent with the capitalist system. The
typical human rights to be protected are rights which seriously prejudice a creditor's ability to realize something on the debt out of admitted
assets of a debtor, or an employer's ability to hire and fire whom he
chooses according to the terms of the labor contract. More generally,
these human rights may be subsumed under the heading of security to
distinguish them from the liberties of the old system which they
are very definitely intended to undermine.
Does our Bill of Rights interpose obstacles to securing these modern rights? I think it does. There is nothing in our Bill of Rights which
hints of economic democracy. It does not suggest any social responsi-
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bilities of property, nor does it contemplate an active campaign by
government to secure the economic freedom of the individual.
Do these things constitute a fair basis for reproach? That depends
on who is doing the reproaching. What I mean is this: One who criticizes the system of property rights under the impression that the private right system as a whole can be preserved without them is wrong.
One who criticizes property while understanding that the defects are
indigenous to the whole system of rights may be right. I do not believe
there is much chance of preserving any individual rights without maintaining the core of private property. One who wants to preserve individual rights is estopped, as the lawyer says, from cavilling against certain necessary characteristics of the system. He must take the bitter
with the sweet. One who is ready to give up a system of rights in
favor of a system of governmentally enforced duties has an arguable
case although I shall not pursue the argument here. It is much more
important that people shall understand the alternatives confronting
them than be persuaded which alternative is the better.
What I am concerned to demonstrate now is that the great battle of
security versus property can not be resolved in favor of security without
sacrificing an independent legal institution. And I think I have said
enough about our Bill of Rights to indicate how its fate is tied up
with that of an independent legal institution.
From a standpoint of this legal institution nothing could be more
incongruous than to say that the regime of private rights might call
for an unlimited increase in the functions of government. So-called
social legislation creates legal advantages of a type which the legal
institution can do nothing to conserve. In other words, they are advantages dependent immediately and at all times upon the largesse of
the government of the day. Administrative judges may and do enforce
such rights in the course of executing changing policies. But the law
as constitutional restraint speaks not at all or else only very feebly
through administrative judges. In short, if legal advantages are to be
effective as instruments of the traditional judicial process they must
become vested advantages and this means that they must be turned
into property.
Of course, the question how much social legislation can be absorbed by the existing system is not easy to answer. Certainly, I do
not wish to be understood as saying that all social legislation is a bad
thing for the legal institution, or that property rights must be maintained at any given degree of potency. We all know that if a powerful
drug is administered with discretion it may have positive therapeutic
effects. So, in the case of the legal institution. A really good political
doctor could probably say how much socialization the patient could
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stand. All I pretend to know is that at some point the dose is likely
to become poisonous.
The conclusion which I suggest, therefore, is this: It is an error to
believe that we can simply substitute personal rights for property
rights. The real substitution involved is that of a system of direct and
complete government control of conduct in place of a balance between
property and government with the courts calling the tune. In a completely socialized economy there is practically nothing for courts (as
we understand their function) to do.
Of course it may be said that, under such circumstances, the courts
could still apply guarantees of intellectual freedom such as religion and
speech, even though there were no other freedom to be maintained
against the government of the day. But it seems extremely unlikely that
the judicial tradition could subsist with so little business. Quite apart
from the fact that one whose day-to-day livelihood is dependent upon
bureaucratic disposition can be coerced pretty effectively in all things
by that bureaucracy, it is hard to see how a complaint of violation of
free speech could be properly approached by the court. How could
a body of men completely imbued with the administrative viewpoint
through their ordinary work be expected suddenly to assume a sympathetic attitude toward the individual?
We are inclined to forget that the substance of even these personal
freedoms was worked out by the courts in a property system. The
privileges of the feudal baron are the legitimate antecedents of practically every constitutional right we possess. It is extremely dangerous
to kick away the lowly scaffolding of liberty until you are quite sure
that you have something to take its place. Perhaps democracy, the
doctrine of majority rule, is that something; but it would be a good
plan to test it out a little more thoroughly before trusting it to take
the weight of civil liberties alone and unaided by a legal institution
based on property.
I have already spent too much time on private rights in normal
times and I want to pass now briefly to a discussion of that contingency, which subjects constitutional rights to the greatest strain, i. e.,
war. War and domestic strife are often the occasion for complete and
frank abdication of law. A declaration of suspension of constitutional
guarantees or of a state of siege is within the province of the executive
according to some constitutional systems. And this means not only that
the usual remedial processes of courts are unavailable but that no kind
of responsibility can ever attach to what was done during the emergency.
Our Bill of Rights is not exposed to any such abrupt shutdown in
times of stress. There is no authority in Anglo-American public
law literature for anything quite so radical. But this has not saved
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us from facing the fact that many peacetime liberties must give way
to military necessity at these times. The most liberal and optimistic
view of the restrictions upon individual rights permissible in war time
is based on a number of propositions which I shall try to organize for
systematic presentation although you had best take it with several
gains of salt.
In the first place, it is held that the only constitutional guarantee
which can be explicitly suspended is the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Technically, this means that it becomes a sufficient return
to the writ to answer that the prisoner is being held under authority
of the United States. No judicial inquiry into the cause of detention
is then possible and a man may be held prisoner indefinitely without
judicial trial. Suspension of the writ does not mean, however, that
the prisoner can be tried and punished by the military, or other than
by the routine procedures of the common law. Nor does it mean. that
the imprisonment itself is in all respects lawful. The jailer is not
liable to contempt proceedings, but he may be liable in damages to
his prisoner if a court later decides that the original imprisonment was
not justified by the emergency.
There are also certain subsidiary questions about suspension of the
writ which the liberal doctrine disposes of as follows: First, it is Congress and not the President who may authorize suspension of the writ.
This is clear enough in the opinion of Chief Justice Taney back in
1861. Lincoln, having seditious Baltimore in mind, undertook to authorize the suspension of the writ at any point on the military line
between Philadelphia and Washington. The writ was issued on behalf
of one Merryman held at Fort McHenry. Taney, being then on Circuit, held the return insufficient and the marshal was instructed to
attach the General in command for contempt of court. Of course the
judicial process wasn't executed but the opinion of Taney has since
been generally accepted as stating the law.
It is also part of liberal doctrine that Congress must authorize suspension of the writ for the particularoccasion and not as a part of a
general investment of power. In other words, no executive officer is
supposed to have this authority in virtue of his office alone. But on
December 7th last the Governor of Hawaii did make use of such authority conferred in the Organic Act of 1900 setting up the government of the territory. Subsequently, a petition for habeas corpus was
sued out on behalf of an American citizen being held by the military
on suspicion of subversive activity. The district judge said that in
his opinion the writ ought to issue but that he would not issue it
because it would be in clear defiance of the military authority.
There is finally an extreme liberal position on habeas corpus to the
effect that the courts may pass on the general need for suspension

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 18

of the writ by Congress. In other words, the question whether the
public safety demands it may become a judicial question when properly presented. This sounds completely unrealistic to me but it is hardly necessary to the liberal position anyhow.
Beyond the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus the liberal
makes certain other concessions to military necessity. For example,
it is readily conceded that the amount of force needed to preserve
order depends on the force to be overcome. The military may accordingly operate alongside the regular constabulary in coping with exceptional violence. And the menace involved would justify "shooting first
and asking questions afterwards." Enforcement of the law is still,
however, under civil auspices. There is no military regime which the
ordinary citizen has to take into account. There is simply a pitched
battle between law breakers and law enforcers which he would do well
to avoid.
Closely connected with this right to meet violence with corresponding violence is the admitted right to take and destroy private property
on the scene of invasion or insurrection. This may be done without
compensation and without preliminary judicial hearing. It is probable
that property may not be commandeered for use without compensation, and in any event, the circumstances of the seizure may later be
reviewed by the courts to determine whether the emergency really
justified the acts.
The liberal position also concedes that military law-the disciplinary law for the armed forces which is meted out by courts martialmay encroach upon civil law in wartime. Under peace time conditions
the soldier is subject to two laws, the law that governs all citizens as
well as the law of the service. In wartime however, he may be completely freed of any responsibility to a civil court. The military
law claims him for its own-and, incidentally, permits him to thumb
his nose at the civil authorities. But in all this there is still no direct
subjection of the civilian population to the military regime.
We come pretty close to this, however, in the last liberal concession to emergency conditions: There is such a thing as military
government in wartime which does substitute completely for the civil
authority. The clearest example of this is in the case of occupied
enemy territory. Here the military is supreme in all things, and,
unless and until a treaty of peace makes that territory American territory, not even Congress will be heard to legislate for it.
There is also such a thing as military government in home territory
-friendly territory, but the important thing to emphasize here from
the liberal standpoint is that military government does not supersede
civil authority as a matter of law. It comes into being only because
the area concerned has become the scene of actual battle and the
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civil authorities are not performing their functions. If civilians do
remain on the scene under such circumstances (which isn't likely) they
automatically become subject to the only law which exists, namely
the orders of the military commander on the spot.
Such authority over civilians also ceases at the moment the civil
authorities can be reestablished. Moreover, complete responsibility
before the ordinary law for any acts taken during the emergency is
supposed to be then enforceable against the officers who performed
them or ordered their performance.
Even in the case of this sort of military government it will therefore be seen that the liberal common law view does not recognize any
situation in which military authority ever supersedes civil authority
within the realm by any sort of formal declaration or legal act. A state
of martial law is not within the competence of any one to order. Or, to
put it more accurately, a declaration of martial law is a gratuitous
thing. The executive or a military commander may warn the community in which troops have been assigned to operate, that disorder
will be sternly dealt with. But the declaration adds nothing to their
power.
Over and against the liberal view I have been talking about there is
another view, which, in England at any rate, seems to be the modern
view. This view does recognize martial law, i. e., a military government for threatened areas in the home territory. Instead of mere suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, it is assumed that the courts may
be required to honor (a) military orders and (b) the judgments of
military courts convened to try and punish civilians for violation of
these orders. Furthermore, the authority to authorize such military
government is supposed to be that of the chief executive, not Congress.
In other words it flows from his inherent powers of office, not from
any express powers nor from Congressional delegation.
Of course, those constitutionalists who so recognize martial law do
not say that either its original declaration, or the validity of particular
acts done in the course of executing it, are free from judicial review.
A civil court is supposed to look at the broad outlines of a situation
to be sure that there is an emergency. And the civil court is afterwards supposed to ask whether there was jurisdiction on the part of
the military to execute such and such a sentence.
The difficulty under this theory is that, once the validity of martial
law is recognized, the courts will treat these questions as essentially
political, i. e., they will not question the judgment of the executive
as to the emergency. For this reason it is not to be denied that the
validity of martial law is a dangerous proposition. On the other hand,
a good many of the presumptions of the liberal view no longer hold
good. Today we cannot assume the fixity of battle fronts nor even
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their obvious character as battles. Such things as parachute troops, to
say nothing of bombing raids, mean that the scene of "battle" is hard
to predict. There is, in fact, no battle line which civilian and civil
processes can withdraw from. And in addition to this there is the fifth
column front-a front which oftentimes materializes from within the
country as part of a deliberate campaign of infiltration.
It is pretty obvious that these changes demand a reexamination of
the older liberal position. It is also obvious that we are preparing to
act on the more conservative theory. Military Commissions to try civilians for breaches of military orders have already been set up in Hawaii. The President has already authorized the military to evacuate
civilians from the threatened areas of the Pacific Coast, and they have
been evacuated. It is true that this has been carried out under somewhat baffling constitutional auspices. There has been no formal suspension of the writ of habeas corpus-far less a declaration of martial law. But the courts have acted on the whole as if the President
could declare martial law if he wanted to. And they have consequently
indicated an unwillingness to interfere at any point with the program.
What we have left to fall back on is the doctrine of responsibility
of the military to the civil courts for what they do in the exercise of
such wide discretion. Happily there is nothing yet to indicate that the
military is disposed to be arbitrary or the courts neglectful.

